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Attention to the question of whether testimony is a distinctive source of knowledge is 
a comparatively recent development in Western epistemology. Does being told that 
p constitute reason for you to believe that p, independently of what you empirically 
establish about the speaker’s reliability, sincerity, and evaluative position? Still more 
recently — in just the last decade — Western epistemologists have become occupied 
with related problems concerning disagreement. What is the rational response, for 
instance, to discovering that an epistemic peer disagrees with you about p? In the 
battery of new articles that explore this question, various fine-grained distinctions 
have been proposed to accommodate cases where it seems that disagreement 
ought to shake our confidence that p and cases where we appear entitled to remain 
steadfast. Inevitably, there has been some overlap and redundancy between these 
rapid-fire proposals. An unfortunate consequence of the shifting structure of our bur-
geoning terminological framework is that disagreement is a difficult topic to teach 
effectively. Confronted with the proliferation of fascinating but increasingly esoteric 
test cases in recent articles, students often find it difficult to see the forest for the trees. 
This is a shame, as the topic is fresh, practically relevant, and packed with the poten-
tial to excite undergraduates.
Bryan Frances’ accessible textbook is therefore a welcome addition to the 
 literature. Disagreement is exceptionally well paced, introducing material over 
 twenty-eight short and engaging chapters. The fifty-five problem cases (or “stories” 
[pp. ix–x]) that Frances provides are carefully explained and sequenced, allowing 
students to gradually refine their understanding of the need for terminological sub-
tlety. By inviting readers to puzzle over his stories, and by both admitting that his own 
views have changed and pointing out where his current position is tentative, Frances 
successfully conveys the youth of this branch of Western epistemology. Readers are 
made to feel that their own innovations could advance philosophical understanding 
of this topic, which would be a great motivation in the classroom.
Instead of critiquing views defended in the current literature, many of which he 
finds “premature” (p. 6), Frances uses his stories to guide readers through the central 
ideas underlying contemporary debates. Throughout, he emphasizes the practical 
question of what philosophy can teach us about everyday disagreements, even going 
so far as to lay out a decision procedure for how to resolve them (p. 110). This 
 approach allows him to touch on many of the issues that undergraduates find most 
interesting, although I found it disappointing that he omits discussion of intraper-
sonal disagreement. (My students have enjoyed reflecting upon the rationality of their 
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own changes of mind, and when they should have trusted their initial judgment.) 
Similarly, although he writes that the “ethics of disagreement” is beyond the scope of 
his book, he misses the opportunity provided by his approach to relate epistemology 
to political theory (p. 76). A chapter examining the link between disagreement and 
collective agency (how should a group whose members disagree decide to act?) 
would also have been appreciated.
Nevertheless, Frances expertly forestalls a number of journeys down blind alleys 
that, in my experience, students are apt to tread when first confronted with this 
 material. Of particular note in this respect are Frances’ distinction between how we 
typically behave when faced with disagreement (when splitting a dinner check, for 
example, we may amicably accept our friend’s calculation rather than quibble over 
a few dollars) and what the standards of rationality require of us in such situations 
(p. 75); his surfacing of key “disagreement factors,” such as the background knowl-
edge and cognitive ability of disputants, which often ground intuitions about how 
seriously we ought to take particular disagreements (p. 26); his contrast between the 
rationality of retaining one’s belief in a case of disagreement and the rationality of 
one’s retained belief, and his subsequent explanation of their independence (p. 80); 
his attention to the differing demands of disagreements between solitary disputants 
and groups of disputants (pp. 94 –98); and, perhaps most of all, his characterization 
of disagreement not just as the problem of whether or not to believe p, but as the 
problem of achieving reflective equilibrium between three beliefs: (a) that p is true, 
(b) that our interlocutor believes p false (and so, that our disagreement is genuine), 
and (c) that our interlocutor counts as an epistemic peer (p. 117).
Frances avoids defending controversial views in his textbook. His prose is ac-
cordingly more explanatory than argumentative. He carefully signals the few places 
where he is giving his own account, most often in opposition to Richard Feldman 
(pp. 128, 185, 191–195). But even here, he sketches rather than details his arguments 
for believing, contra Feldman, that there may be reasonable and mutually recognized 
disagreements between epistemic peers after each has come to appreciate the other’s 
evidence. The interested reader must seek out the relevant articles for herself. Frances 
also opines that there is, in general, no uniquely reasonable way to assess the evi-
dence for p (p. 186); that upon discovery of a disagreement one may legitimately cite 
one’s original evidence as a reason for steadfastly retaining belief in p (p. 188); and 
that recent attention to “conditional peers” — those of whom we judge that if we dis-
agree we are equally likely to be correct, as opposed to those to whom we grant peer 
status only because we anticipate that they would agree with our judgments — is of 
little help in evaluating real life cases (p. 190). I disagree with this last point: Frances’ 
worry that we are seldom justified in judging someone a conditional peer misses the 
point that some of our most intractable disagreements are with people we judge to 
be conditional peers, justified or no. But whatever one’s own view, any of these is-
sues could serve as a prompt for an undergraduate research paper, and Frances’ lucid 
discussion may inspire such a project.
I can envisage at least three undergraduate courses that would benefit from 
adopting this stimulating text. First, Disagreement could be used in a global philos-
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ophy course. With some notable exceptions (see the contributions of Matilal and 
Chakrabarti 1994), Western scholars have largely neglected the long history of 
non-Western thought regarding testimony and disagreement. Although Frances does 
not buck this trend, his discussions are self-standing and so would not require an 
extended digression into the methodology of Western epistemology. Furthermore, 
certain parts of his book (such as the material on religious disagreement [pp. 157–
170]) invite comparative study. Paired with an introductory text to non-Western 
thought on the reliability of testimony (such as Phillips 2012), Disagreement could 
certainly ground a unit on epistemology.
Second, the text is appropriate for an introduction to philosophy course. I gener-
ally allot epistemology three to four weeks in such classes, and after a historical in-
troduction to Descartes’ skeptical method, I have hitherto sought to give students a 
taste of contemporary work by discussing the Gettier problem and experimental phi-
losophy. Armed with this book, however, one could easily swap out these topics for 
disagreement. Frances conveniently trifurcates his basic material with summaries of 
key results, which could correspond to three class meetings. (The closing twenty-five 
pages ease transition to further literature, and could be omitted.) Non-majors would 
find his stories engaging, and if his tone is occasionally judgmental (as when he 
 classifies those who have yet to reflect upon the challenge posed by religious plural-
ism as at an earlier “stage” [p. 164]), it is never unkind. Finally, and to my mind most 
importantly, Frances models both the labor and the benefit of critically thinking about 
a philosophical problem by refining his epistemic principles in light of the new con-
siderations that his stories raise. Disagreement presents a pedagogical opportunity to 
introduce students to both philosophical content and method.
Third, and perhaps most obviously, Frances’ book is suitable for an upper-level 
epistemology course. Advanced undergraduates could cover the material in a week 
or two, and would be very well positioned to pursue their own research agendas 
with more challenging articles. In his final chapter, “Study Questions and Problems,” 
Frances probes the boundaries of his book with questions that could stand as term 
paper topics. His curated guide to further reading is also helpful (pp. 208–211).
Students in any of the three classes just described have much to gain from 
 Frances’ masterful treatment of his subject. Overall, Disagreement is an extremely 
useful resource that I recommend to any scholar interested in addressing the topic in 
his or her own courses.
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